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Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High Courts? 
 
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner* 
 
 
In April 2008, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Louis Butler lost an election to a 
challenger, Michael Gableman, in a race marked by record-breaking campaign spending and 
charges of ideological bias.1  Conservatives accused Justice Butler of liberal activism, while 
Justice Butler’s allies argued that Gableman would, if elected, be a tool of conservative 
ideologues and business interests.  A Wall Street Journal columnist, citing a recent study by Jake 
Dear and Edward Jessen that found that the Wisconsin Supreme Court was the eighth most cited 
by other state courts, argued that the defeat has “national implications” and “sends a signal that a 
judge who dramatically oversteps traditional boundaries can be brought to account.”2  The 
columnist did not pause to consider whether Wisconsin’s high court enjoyed its high standing 
because of Justice Butler and colleagues like him, or despite them. 
 
The study in which Wisconsin placed eighth ranked states according to how often 
decisions by their high courts were “followed” by out-of-state courts, as defined by the 
Shepherd’s citation system.3  Other academic studies that rank states have used similar 
methodologies—in general, focusing on the extent to which a state’s high court is cited by out-
of-state high courts.4  The Dear & Jessen study received some attention in the media.5  But by far 
that most influential ranking of state courts—focusing on the entire legal systems, not just the 
high courts—has been produced by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which conducts annual 
surveys of lawyers that ask them for their evaluations of state courts.6 
 
 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce surveys ask senior lawyers at corporations that earn 
more than $100 million per year in revenues to grade state court systems, from A to F, and 
aggregate their responses.  The overall ranking of Wisconsin in the 2008 survey was 24th, well 
                                                 
* NYU Law School, Duke Law School, and the University of Chicago Law School.  Thanks to Un Kyung Park and 
the participants at a workshop at Duke Law School for their comments, and to Jake Dear and Edward Jessen for 
sharing their data. 
1 Scott Bauer, Report Shows Special Interests Dominated Wis. Supreme Court Race, The Journal Times, April 9, 
2008; The Wisconsin “Tragedy,” The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2008, at p. A14. 
2 John Fund, Wisconsin’s Judicial Revolution, The Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2008, at p. A5.  We discuss this 
study, infra. 
3 Jake Dear & Edward Jessen, “Followed” Cases and Leading State Cases, 1940-2005, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 683 
(2007). 
4 See Part I, infra. 
5 See Adam Liptak, Around the Country, High Courts Follow California’s Lead, New York Times, March 11, 2008 
at A12; Pamela A. MacLean, Calif. Up, N.Y. Down in Study Gauging Influence: Washington, Arizona, New Jersey 
Courts Show Surprising Weight, The National Law Journal, March 3, 2008.. 
6 Related are the reports of so-called “judicial hellholes” put out by organizations like the American Tort Reform 
Association (that are applauded by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).  See 
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2004/december/04-163.htm 
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below its ranking in the Dear & Jessen study.7  Wisconsin judges’ impartiality was rated 23rd, 
competence was rated 17th, predictability was rated 20th, and fairness was rated 22nd.8  Whereas 
California ranks first in the Dear & Jessen study, it ranks near the bottom (44th out of 50) in the 
2008 U.S. Chamber of Commerce study.9 
 
 What accounts for these differences?  First, Dear and Jessen focus on state supreme 
courts, while the Chamber of Commerce evaluates the entire judicial system.  It is possible that 
good state supreme courts preside over mediocre trial and lower appellate courts.  Second, Dear 
and Jessen focus on out-of-state influence, while the Chamber of Commerce focuses on in-state 
performance.  Out-of-state influence might be a good proxy for the quality of supreme court 
opinions, but it also might not be; it is possible that a supreme court that writes influential 
opinions is not fair or predictable, though it is hard to believe that it is not competent.  Third, and 
most important, Dear and Jessen, in effect, survey out-of-state judges, while the Chamber of 
Commerce surveys business lawyers.  We might expect business lawyers to have different 
attitudes toward judicial decisionmaking.  Business lawyers probably give high marks to courts 
that decide cases in a manner that businesses like—rejecting punitive damages, for example—
while out-of-state judges need not share these views. 
 
 We will have more to say about the methodological assumptions of the Chamber of 
Commerce study.10  It is sufficient to point out that U.S. Chamber of Commerce rankings have 
been more influential than Dear and Jessen’s ranking, and much more so than those by 
academics.  They have been cited by state legislators to criticize their judiciaries and ask for 
reform, by a judicial pay compensation commission as a justification for a salary increase, and 
by two governors to advertise the attractiveness of their states for big business.11 The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce has used its annual survey of state court systems as a means to pressure 
state legislatures to improve their court systems.12  Academics have also used the rankings in 
                                                 
72008 U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, available at: 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states/lawsuitclimate2008/pdf/FullHarrisSurvey.pdf, p. 15. 
8 Id. at 33-36. 
9 Id. at 15. 
10 See Part V. 
11 For the advertisement on the Delaware Governor’s website, see 
http://governor.delaware.gov/news/2004/03march/030804%20-%20u.s.%20chamber%20ranking.shtml (quoting 
Justice Norm Veasey as saying: “The Judicial Branch of Delaware government is extremely pleased and gratified 
that our Courts rank number one in the nation in the quality of our litigation system.”); see also 
http://www.governor.virginia.gov/MediaRelations/newsReleases/viewRelease.cfm?id=213 (website of the Governor 
of Virginia, talking about Virginia’s high ranking on the Chamber of Commerce survey).  For discussions of the 
rankings and the need for reforms to improve rankings, see.e.g., 
http://www.kansaschamber.org/forms/advo3/V3Num14.htm (noting Kansas’ drop from 4 to 16th).  On the use of 
rankings to argue for salary increases, see Iowa Judicial Compensation Task Force, available at 
http://www.iowabar.org/miscdocuments.nsf/2b85a4ea12f4bfac8625669d006e27ab/f0fb92e322a9987d86256ff20049
a0bb/$FILE/Judicial%20compensation.pdf.   
12 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce remarks, at 
http://www.uschamber.com/press/speeches/2006/060327_ilr_rankings_remarks.htm: 
But there's still quite a ways to go before we can rid our courts of lawsuit abuse and correct the deep flaws 
in our legal system.  One of the key weapons in our arsenal is the annual State Liability Systems Ranking 
Study. 
Since the inception of the study, it has become the benchmark against which businesses, elected officials, 
the media and other opinion leaders measure their state's legal climate.   
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empirical studies of the relationship between judicial quality and institutional design.13  Groups 
like the Ralph Nader led organization, Public Citizen, have complained that these rankings are 
biased toward the interests of big business.14  But, in the absence of meaningful competitive 
rankings, this is the equivalent of law schools urging students to ignore the U.S. News rankings.  
It doesn’t work.  Rather than urge people to ignore imperfect rankings, we should develop better 
rankings. 
 
Why rank state courts?  As we saw, the Wall Street Journal columnist believed that the 
Wisconsin judicial race was significant because the Wisconsin Supreme Court is a highly ranked 
court.  People whose lives are influenced by out-of-state supreme courts (through, for example, 
the influence of the out-of-state court’s opinions on the decisionmaking of courts in their own 
states) benefit by knowing which of those courts have the most influence.  At a minimum, they 
might want to get involved when judges on that court are being selected, and to contribute 
amicus briefs and other assistance when litigation with out-of-state implications is being 
conducted.  Accurate rankings of state courts can also help legal research.  If the best judicial 
opinions are the product of courts rather than individual judges, then judges, lawyers, and 
scholars who are searching for well-reasoned cases will benefit by knowing which courts are 
most likely to produce those cases. 
 
 Finally, ranking states courts might contribute to reform.  State courts vary greatly along 
various institutional dimensions—how judges are selected, how much they are paid, and so forth.  
It is reasonable to think that the best courts have the best institutional design.  Perhaps, appointed 
judges are better than elected judges, or highly-paid judges are better than less well-paid judges.  
A state unhappy with its judicial system might try to imitate the systems of states that have well-
regarded judiciaries; or judges on low-ranked courts might try to imitate the case-management 
system of judges on higher-ranked courts.  There has been controversy about these issues in 
recent years.  Critics ranging from former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to novelist John 
Grisham, have attacked judicial election systems, pointing to recent campaigns involving 
undignified rhetoric, ideologically tinged campaign promises that are at odds with the judicial 
role, and the influence of moneyed interests.15    
 
                                                                                                                                                             
They want to see how they stack up against other states, and also how well – or poorly – the system is 
serving employers, workers and consumers. 
13 E.g., Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, Initial Conditions, Institutional Dynamics and Economic Performance: 
Evidence from the American States, March 2004 draft (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=485003#PaperDownload) (using the 2002 Chamber of 
Commerce rankings as a measure of court quality in the different states); Russell S. Sobel & Joshua C. Hall, The 
Effect of Judicial Selection Processes on Judicial Quality: The Role of Partisan Politics, 27 Cato J. 69 (2007); 
Russell S. Sobel, Matt E. Ryan, & Joshua C. Hall, Electoral Pressures and the Legal System: Friends or Foes? in 
Law Without Romance: Public Choice and Legal Institutions (E. Lopez ed. forthcoming).(available at 
http://joshua.c.hall.googlepages.com/electoralpressures.pdf).  Neither of the latter two studies mention that the 
Chamber and Commerce data reflect the views of only lawyers at corporations with annual revenues of at least $100 
million. 
14 See Public Citizen Complaints at http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/0309-10.htm; see also 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf (complaint regarding the Judicial Hellholes reports). 
15 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice For Sale, Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2007 (available at 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110010864); John Grisham, The Appeal (2007). 
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On the salary front, federal and state judges have been complaining about low pay for 
years, arguing that low pay is forcing many high quality judges to leave the bench to move to the 
private sector.16 Chief Judge Judith Kaye, of the New York Court of Appeals, has filed a lawsuit 
against the governor and legislative leaders of New York State for failing to fund cost-of-living 
increases over a nine year period, during which judicial salaries eroded by 25 percent in real 
terms.17  Judge Kaye argues that the failure to raise pay has undermined the effectiveness of the 
judiciary and hence judicial independence. 
 
In earlier work, we showed that the relationship between institutional design and judicial 
quality is complex, and does not lend much support to the conventional wisdom.  Appointed 
judges write more frequently-cited opinions than elected judges do, but elected judges are more 
productive, while there seems to be no difference between their levels of independence.18  
Judicial pay has little effect on judicial quality, except among elected judges, who are more 
productive when paid more.19  It is not the purpose of this Article to review or reproduce these 
findings.  Our goal instead is to generate a ranking of the state high courts on the basis of the 
data that we collected for the earlier studies.  We will argue that our ranking overcomes many of 
the defects of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce study, as well as those of earlier academic work. 
 
Rankings make people uneasy.  They seem to trivialize activities that are of public 
importance, and they may stimulate the ranked agents or institutions to engage in destructive 
competition or demoralize those that have no ability to escape from the bottom.  The most 
serious objection to rankings is that they unavoidably rely on measures that neglect hard-to-
observe but important aspects of performance.  If nonetheless those who achieve a high ranking 
are rewarded with resources or public esteem, institutions will distort their missions so as to do 
well on whatever measures are used.20 
 
We address this objection by making our rankings as transparent and flexible as possible.  
Readers might disagree about how to weight the different measures that we use, and we show 
how such disagreements may lead to different rankings of the state courts.  The alternative to 
rankings is, as a practical matter, virtually no information, and public institutions that are not 
carefully monitored and evaluated will rarely have strong incentives to perform well.  Rankings, 
however imperfect, serve an important information-forcing function.21  Institutions that do 
poorly on rankings should have the burden of coming forth with an explanation for their 
performance; but if the explanation is plausible, then the ranking should be discounted.  Better 
still, if the stakes are high enough – and the amounts of money spent by institutions like the U.S. 
                                                 
16 See Doug Sherwin, Top Justices Decry Professions’ Lagging Salaries, The Daily Transcript, Jan 10, 2007.  
17 See Joel Stashenko & Daniel Wise, Kaye Sues State Over Judicial Salaries, N.Y. L. J. April 11, 2008 (available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/judicial_pay_impasse.jsp) 
18 Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an 
Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (unpub. m.s. 2008) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008989). 
19 Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric Posner, Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary 
Debate (forthcoming, Journal Legal Analysis, 2008) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1077295). 
20 See Steve Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B, 18 Acad. Mgt. Rev. 769 (1975). 
21 For more on information forcing see Scott Baker, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, The Rat Race as an Information-
Forcing Device, 81 Ind. L.J. 53 (2006). 
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Chamber of Commerce on commissioning rankings suggest there are22 – competitor rankings 
should emerge that improve upon the prior ones.  
 
 We begin with a survey of the state court ranking literature in Part I.  Part II describes our 
ranking method.  Parts III provides our rankings of courts; Part IV discusses some problems with 
our rankings and possible solutions; and Part V tackles the Chamber of Commerce Survey. 
 
 
I.  Prior Literature 
 
We are aware of five academic articles that rank the state high courts.  In addition, since 
2002, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has issued annual rankings based on surveys of senior 
lawyers employed by large businesses. 
 
Lawrence Friedman, Robert Kagan, Bliss Cartwright and Stanton Wheeler examined a 
data set consisting of approximately 6000 cases from the state high courts for discrete intervals 
of time in the 1870-1970 period.23  Focusing on sixteen state high courts, the study uses the 
evolution in patterns of opinion writing style and citations over a century to draw inferences 
about court behavior.  The study does not provide a detailed ranking of all the state high courts in 
terms of citations, but does give a rough sense of which states dominated over the different 
periods during that century.  In the quarter century, 1870-95, the stars were New York, 
Massachusetts and California.  New York stood out during the early portion of that period, but its 
influence had begun to wane at the end.  By 1925, the courts in Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin 
and Pennsylvania had begun to emerge as influential.  Finally, in 1945-1970, California had 
emerged as a star.  New Jersey, Texas and Illinois also showed themselves as among the more 
influential in terms of citations.  Overall, for 1870-1970, the four top states were New York, 
California, Massachusetts and Illinois.   
   
Rodney Mott’s 1936 study covered a more limited period, roughly from 1900 to 1930.24   
Mott used multiple measures of court prestige that included: (1) a survey of law professors who 
were asked about the esteem with which they held the various courts; (2) the extent to which 
cases from the different courts found their way into casebooks; (3) citations from other state high 
courts; (4) citations from the U.S. Supreme Court.  The top and bottom ten states in Mott’s 
composite ranking are reported in Table 1.  Consistent with the numbers from Friedman et al., 
Mott reports New York, Massachusetts, California and Illinois as among the top performers.  
The steep drop in numbers from the top two states, New York and Massachusetts and the others 
– on all of Mott’s measures – is worth noting.  This superstar effect, where a couple of the 
players dramatically outdo the others, is relevant for making comparison across time because it 
suggests the strong possibility that modifications of the measures – for example, adjusting for the 
number of judges on the court – would still leave the superstar states at the top.  At the bottom 
                                                 
22 Although we do not have data on the amounts spent by the Chamber of Commerce on its rankings, we suspect 
they are not cheap.  As background, in 2007, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent $52,750,000 in lobbying money.  
The Institute for Legal Reform (which does the survey) spent $21,910,000 of that money. 
(http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/clientsum.asp?year=2007&txtname=US+Chamber+of+Commerce). 
23 Lawrence Friedman et al., State  Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 733 (1981). 
24 Rodney L. Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 295 (1936). 
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end in Mott’s composite rankings are Florida and the western states of Nevada, Arizona, New 
Mexico and Wyoming.  Many of the western states were still relatively young, and their low 
ranks may have been due to their less developed bodies of case law.   
 
Roughly fifty years later, building on Mott’s work, but focusing exclusively on citation 
measures, Gregory Caldeira re-ranked the state high courts.25   Caldeira looked at a single year, 
1975, and his method of calculation differed from Mott’s; Caldeira adjusted the citation numbers 
to discount for the propensity of some states to make outside citations for reasons other than the 
quality of the state high courts.  For example, Alaska might have cited to more outside state 
courts than did other states because it didn’t have much of its own case law.  Caldeira also 
looked only at a single measure, citations from the high courts to each other.  Table 1 reports the 
top and bottom performers in Caldeira’s rankings.  Despite the half-century gap between his 
study and Mott’s, the states in the top ten are similar.  The only difference between 1930 and 
1975 in the top ten states is that Washington replaces Minnesota.  The suggestions of a superstar 
effect present in Mott’s results – with the top two states significantly outdoing the others – 
remains, except that the two superstar states are now California and New York as opposed to 
New York and Massachusetts.  At the bottom, there are a number of new states, the three 
holdovers at the bottom being Nevada, South Dakota and Wyoming.           
 
In 2002, Scott Comparato updated Caldiera’s study with data from 2000 using similar 
measurement methods.26  While Caldeira’s study looked at every case cited in 1975, Comparato 
uses random samples of thirty cases from each state court.  Despite the twenty-five year gap, the 
identities of the top performing states remain remarkably stable.  California and New York take 
the top two superstar spots and remain a good way ahead of the others.  New entrants into the top 
ranks include Minnesota and Colorado.  At the bottom, there is more turnover, with Texas, 
Vermont, Louisiana, and Tennessee showing up. 
 
Most recently, Jake Dear and Edward Jessen have offered a ranking based on a novel 
measure of influence.27  Contending that the standard measure of outside court citations was too 
crude, Dear and Jessen counted, for the period from 1940 to 2005, the number of times the 
Shepherd’s citation service designated a decision as “followed or used as persuasive authority.”28  
California again dominates, with Washington coming in second. Massachusetts and New York 
remain in the top ten, and there are states such as Oregon and Kansas that show up for the first 
time.  At the bottom, there are some new entrants, including Virginia and Delaware.  In Table 1, 
we report their rankings only for cases decided from 1998-2000, rather than from 1940-2005; 
this permits a closer comparison to our ranking, which uses 1998-2000 data.29 
 
The final ranking comes from a non-academic study.  This is a ranking of the various 
state courts put out by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (for purposes of our discussion, we focus 
                                                 
25 Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 Pol. Behav. 83 (1983). 
26 Scott A. Comparato, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts Revisited (unpublished draft dated April 2002; 
on file with authors). 
27 Dear & Jessen, supra, at 690-93.   
28 Id. 
29 For 1940-2005, the top ten states are, in order: California, Washington, Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon, New York. 
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on the 2002 rankings).30  In this study, close to 1,500 senior lawyers working at firms with 
revenues of at least $100 million annually were surveyed annually since 2001 for their 
evaluations of the different state legal systems.  As we will discuss in Part V, there is good 
reason to doubt that these particular lawyers would provide an objective evaluation of state legal 
systems, as opposed to an evaluation that reflects the perspective of a lawyer who works for a 
large corporation.  That said, two of the survey questions ask for evaluations of judicial 
performance and presumably the performance of the high courts is correlated with that of the 
lower courts in the state.  These rankings are very much at odds with the prior rankings.  The 
states showing up at the top in 2002, for example, include Delaware, Virginia, and Nebraska, 
states that have not shown up at the top on any of the citation based rankings (actually, Delaware 
and Virginia have shown up closer to the bottom on some of the citation counts).  At the other 
end, the Chamber of Commerce surveys have the perennial superstar performer on the citation 
measures, California, near the bottom (ranked 34th for judicial impartiality, 28th for judicial 
competence, and 45th under the “overall” ranking), along with another perennial front runner in 
the citation studies, Illinois (ranked 38th for judicial impartiality, 39th for judicial competence, 
and 34th under the “overall” ranking).31 
 
 
Table 1: Prior Studies 
Panel A: Top Ten Performing States by Study 
1945-1970 
Kagan et al., 
citation 
ranking 
1900-30 Mott 
composite 
ranking 
1975 Caldeira 
citation ranking 
2000 
Comparato 
citation 
ranking  
1998-2000 
Dear & Jessen 
“followed”  
citations 
 2002 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Survey – 
Judges’ 
Impartiality 
2002 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Survey – 
Judges’ 
Competence 
California New York California California California Delaware Delaware 
New Jersey Massachusetts New York New York Washington Colorado Washington 
Texas Illinois New Jersey Minnesota Nebraska Washington Virginia 
Illinois New Jersey Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Kansas Iowa Iowa 
 California Massachusetts Colorado Massachusetts Wisconsin Minnesota 
 Pennsylvania Wisconsin Michigan Connecticut Connecticut Colorado 
 Michigan Illinois Washington Montana Nebraska Arizona 
 Minnesota Washington Illinois Iowa Oregon Connecticut 
 Wisconsin Iowa New Jersey Maryland Virginia New York 
 Iowa Michigan Wisconsin Texas-Civil Minnesota Wisconsin 
  
Panel B: Bottom Ten Performing States by Study 
                                                 
30 2005 U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, Final Report Dates March 8, 2005. 
31 Less directly on point are a handful of other studies that could also be read to contain rankings of the states but 
that we do not discuss because they are tangential to our inquiry.  For example, a 1981 study by Bradley and Canon 
compared the states in terms of their innovativeness in terms of being willing to adopt a set of 23 plaintiff-friendly 
tort law doctrines.   Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations, 75 Amer. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 975 (1981).  There are also a number of other studies that examine the citation patterns of individual 
state courts.  Merryman, for example, in two studies twenty years apart, looked at the citation practices of the 
California Supreme Court, which could be read to be California’s ranking of the rest of the state high courts.  John 
Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 
613 (1954); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Patterns of 
the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960 and 1970, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381 (1977). 
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1870-1895 
Kagan et al., 
ranking 
1900-30 Mott 
composite 
ranking 
1975 
Caldeira 
citation 
ranking  
2000 
Comparato 
citation ranking  
1998-2000 
Dear & 
Jessen 
“followed”  
citation 
 2002 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Survey – 
Judges’ 
Impartiality 
2002 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Survey – 
Judges’ 
Competence 
N/A Montana Maine Texas Idaho Arkansas S. Carolina 
 Arkansas S. Carolina Louisiana Arizona S. Carolina Kentucky 
 Utah W. Virginia West Virginia Utah Hawaii Hawaii 
 South Dakota Nevada Rhode Island Delaware New Mexico Arkansas 
 Idaho North Dakota North Dakota  Louisiana Montana Texas 
 Wyoming Rhode Island Tennessee  Oregon Texas Montana 
 Florida Vermont Nevada Kentucky Alabama W. Virginia 
 Nevada Hawaii Alaska Hawaii W. Virginia Louisiana 
 Arizona South Dakota Maine New Mexico Louisiana  Alabama 
 New Mexico Wyoming Vermont Missouri Mississippi Mississippi 
 
Our study differs from these prior studies in several ways.  First, we use three measures 
rather than one measure of judicial quality—productivity and independence as well as opinion-
quality.  Second, for opinion quality we use citations (unlike Dear and Jessen) but we do not 
adjust them for state size (unlike Caldeira and Comparato).  Third, we do not survey lawyers.  
The differences between our approach and the earlier studies are driven partly by a different 
focus—the quality of the courts rather than (only) their influence—and partly by our different 
judgments about how to measure influence.  We return to these differences when we compare 
our results to those of the earlier studies.  
 
 
II.  Ranking Criteria 
 
 Everyone agrees that some courts are better than other courts, and that, at least in 
principle, one can rank courts according to their quality.  But some might be troubled by the idea 
that courts can be ranked objectively—that is, by using publicly verifiable information about 
their decisions.  Too much of what a courts does cannot be observed or measured objectively, 
and so objective measures are more likely to mislead than to enlighten.32 
 
 This skepticism might reflect some part of the truth but it sweeps too broadly.  One can 
say the same thing about virtually any institution—and a court, of course, is just a particular type 
of institution.  Consider the problem of evaluating employees.  Employers need to measure the 
performance of employees so that they can set compensation, fire and promote, and in other 
ways provide incentives to work productively.  Almost all types of work involve a mixture of 
activities that can be observed and measured, and activities that cannot be observed and 
measured.  For example, a law firm might evaluate its lawyers on the basis of hours billed, briefs 
written, cases argued and won, and so forth, but the firm will also be conscious that how the 
lawyer handles clients, how efficiently the lawyer spends her hours, how well she gets along 
with colleagues—all are components of her productivity.  If the firm rewards her entirely on the 
basis of her measurable activities, then she will have an incentive to shirk with respect to the 
unmeasurable activities.  In practice, law firms and other employers base compensation decisions 
                                                 
32 E.g., Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 Fla. St. L. Rev. 1237 (2004); William P. 
Marshall, Be Careful What You Wish For, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 119 (2004). 
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on both types of activities, using measurable criteria as a broad gauge, but also relying on the 
judgments of supervisors and colleagues regarding the unmeasurable activities. 
 
 These same considerations apply to judges and, a fortiori, to courts.  The objective 
measures that we use capture some aspects of judicial quality but not all of it.  It would be a 
mistake to believe that small differences in measured outcomes reflect significant differences in 
quality.  But where the differences are large, it is likely that the lower-ranked judges or courts are 
inferior, at least unless a good reason can be given to explain the difference.33 
 
 We use three measures of quality: productivity, influence, and independence.  We apply 
these measures to a data set consisting of the decisions of all the judges of the highest court of 
every state for the three years from 1998 to 2000.  We exclude the District of Columbia, and we 
treat the separate civil and criminal high courts in Texas and Oklahoma as, in effect, separate 
states.  We thus have 52 “states.” 
 
 We use these years so that we can compile enough out-of-state citations to provide for 
meaningful comparison (up through 2006).  Unfortunately, many judges on the bench in the 
period have retired, and many judges on the benches today are new.  Nonetheless, our ranking is 
relatively comprehensive. 
 
 There are 408 judges in our data set, about 8 per court.  The average judge was in office 
2.65 years of the 3 years that we examine, and wrote about 67 opinions per year.  We examine 
the productivity, citations, and average independence of all of the judges on the bench during the 
period.  We thus produce productivity, citations, and independence measures for the courts, and 
rank them accordingly.   
  
A.  Productivity 
 
 Productivity refers to the number of opinions a judge publishes in a year.  All else equal, 
a judge who publishes more opinions is better than a judge who publishes fewer opinions.  There 
are two reasons for this.  First, if all opinions are published, then a judge who publishes more 
opinions, decides more cases, thus resolving more disputes between people.  Dispute resolution 
is the judge’s core function, and the more disputes a judge resolves, the greater is the service that 
she is providing.  Note that in some states judges decide cases without issuing opinions.  In these 
states, we cannot assume that judges who publish more opinions also decide more cases.  States 
also vary in terms of whether there are intermediate appellate courts that screen cases before they 
get to the high court and in terms of the degree to which the high court’s jurisdiction is 
discretionary.  Although we do not do it here, we can, to a limited extent, control for those 
institutional differences by using information about publication and jurisdictional rules and 
practices.34  Further, the scholarship from judges and court-watchers tells us that published 
opinions are more likely to involve effort from the judges, whereas unpublished dispositions and 
short orders are more likely to be the work of secondary personnel.  Publication rates, therefore, 
                                                 
33 For further discussion of methodological issues involved in ranking judges, see Stephen J. Choi, & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
23 (2004).  
34 See Choi, Gulati, & Posner, Professionals or Politicians, supra. 
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can provide a better measure of individual judge effort than overall case decision rates.  Second, 
a judge who publishes an opinion shares her reasoning with the parties and with other judges 
who seek to understand the resolution of the dispute.  High publication rates in this way benefit 
the system, and suggest a high-quality judge. 
 
 A judge who publishes frequently might write lower-quality opinions than a judge who 
writes and publishes less frequently.  So productivity is only a partial measure of a judge’s 
merits.  We address quality in Section B.  
 
 The most productive court in our 1998 to 2000 dataset was Georgia’s (58.33 opinions per 
judge year); the least productive was New Mexico’s (10.07 opinions per judge year); the median 
state was Kansas (23.0 opinions per judge per year). 
 
B.  Influence or Opinion-Quality 
 
 Opinion-quality refers to the quality of the reasoning in an opinion.  We measure opinion 
quality by using a proxy: the number of out-of-state citations by state high courts defined to 
equal the sum of all citations to majority opinions published by the state high court in question 
from other state courts, federal courts (other than the home federal circuit), and the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  (In other work, we use other proxies for quality as well, such as law review citations; 
these measures are highly correlated with out-of-state citations by state high courts.35)  We 
assume that a high-quality opinion is more likely to be useful for out-of-state courts, and 
therefore is more likely to be cited.36 
 
 The citations measure can be given two different interpretations.  We use it as a proxy for 
the intrinsic quality of the reasoning in the opinion.  A high-quality opinion benefits the litigants 
themselves, but also everyone in the state whose activities might bring them under the law in 
question.  But out-of-state citations are also a (more) direct measure of out-of-state influence.  It 
is not entirely clear whether a state’s residents would prefer to have judges who are influential 
out of state or not; these judges might be better than are necessary to get the job done, and they 
benefit outsiders rather than residents.  Still, we think that out-of-state citations are a useful 
measure of quality. 
 
 California was the most-cited court for the 1998 to 2000 period, with 33.76 outside 
citations per judge year (majority opinions only).  Oklahoma’s criminal high court was the least-
cited, with 3.69 outside citations per judge year.  The median state was South Dakota (13.07 
outside citations per judge year). 
 
C.  Independence 
 
 Independence refers to the judge’s ability to withstand partisan pressures, or 
disinclination to indulge partisan preferences, when deciding cases.  Our measure of 
independence gives a judge a high score if he is more likely to vote with opposite-party judges 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 See, e.g., William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of 
Federal Courts of Appeal Judges, 27 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1998). 
11 
 
and a low score if he is more likely to vote with same-party judges.  We focus on votes by judges 
in situations where the judge faces an opposing opinion, defined as either a majority opinion 
when the judge writes a dissent, or a dissent when the judge joins the majority.  We assume that 
a judge exhibits independence when she writes an opposing opinion against a co-partisan.   
 
 For each judge, we obtained information on the political affiliation of the judge.  In a few 
states, all the high court judges belong to the same party in our data set, and so we cannot assign 
those judges an independence score.37  In our sample, 220 judges were classified as a Democrat 
and 170 as a Republican (with 16 no data or Independent party judges).   
 
We define Opposite_Party as the number of opposing opinions written, by the judge of 
interest, against a judge of the opposite party divided by the number of opposing opinions written 
against a judge of either party from 1998 to 2000.  This variable measures propensity to side with 
co-partisans.  Not all opposing opinions are driven by the ideology of the opposing judges.  A 
judge who dissents at random would dissent 70% of the time against an opposite party judge if 
the background pool of majority opinions consisted of 70% opposite party authored opinions.  
To take into account the background pool of opinions, we define Opposite Pool as the total 
number of majority opinions authored by an opposite party judge divided by the total number of 
majority opinions authored by either an opposite or same party judge (not including the judge in 
question) from 1998 to 2000.   
 
 We define Independence as Opposite_Pool minus Opposite_Party.  A more negative 
Independence score corresponds to a judge who writes opposing opinions against opposite party 
judges more frequently than the background pool of majority opinions authored by opposite 
party judges.  Conversely, a more positive Independence score corresponds to an authoring judge 
who writes opposing opinions less frequently against opposite party judges compared with the 
background pool of opinions (and thus more frequently against co-partisans).  We treat a more 
positive Independence score as indicative of a more independent judge. 
 
 Our independence measure does not capture all the meanings of judicial independence.  
Judges who take bribes or favor wealthy or powerful litigants are not independent, but our 
independence measure does not capture such activity.  One can also imagine cases where a 
judge’s policy preferences influence their decisions, which is improper, but these policy 
preferences are idiosyncratic and do not track partisan divisions.  Our independence measure 
misses these cases as well. 
 
 The independence score ranges from -1 (least independent) to 1 (most independent).  The 
court with the highest mean independence score among judges for the 1998 to 2000 period was 
Rhode Island’s, with a mean independence score of 0.19; the least independent court was that of 
Mississippi, which had a mean independence score of -0.31.  The median was -0.02.  
                                                 
37 For a detailed description of our independence measure, see Choi, Gulati, & Posner, Professionals or Politicians, 
supra.  In another paper, Choi and Gulati treat a 0 independence score as highest on the theory that zero 
independence means that party affiliation makes no difference to case outcomes.  See Choi & Gulati, Choosing, 
supra.  However, we think that, in the present setting, a judge who votes against partisan affiliation is most likely to 
be more independent, as it shows that he or she feels strongly about the outcome.  It’s possible that the judge 
switched ideologies while sitting, but prior scholarship indicates that this is highly unusual.  See Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited 314 (2002). 
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D.  Composite Measures 
 
 Suppose that a court ranks highly on one measure but not so well on the other two 
measures, whereas another court does worse on the first measure but better on the other two.  
Which court is better?  Ideally, we would have a theory that tells us how much each measure 
should be weighted; but we have no such theory.  One might think that independence is much 
more important than productivity and quality, or one might think not.  Equal weight for each 
measure is no less arbitrary than counting only one measure and ignoring the other two. 
 
 The problem is not necessarily serious, however.  Suppose it is the case that courts that 
do well on one measure also tend to do well on other measures.  If the rankings along each 
measure are largely consistent, then overall rankings can easily be obtained.  As the rankings 
become less consistent, noise is introduced into the rankings, but it doesn’t necessarily defeat the 
exercise.  Finally, readers can decide for themselves how much they weight the different 
measures, and interpret our results accordingly. 
 
 Hence, we use an approach that allows for various weightings.  Under this composite 
approach, we construct rankings under several possible weightings, and we display them in a 
manner that allows the reader to focus on whatever measures she believes are most important.  
 
 
III.  Ranking the Courts 
 
A.  The Court Systems 
 
 All states have a hierarchical system, with trial courts at the bottom and a supreme or 
highest court at the top.  Most but not all states have intermediate appellate courts.  Two states—
Texas and Oklahoma—have two high courts, one for criminal appeals and the other for civil 
appeals.  Many high courts have mandatory jurisdiction: they must hear appeals.  Others have 
discretionary jurisdiction.  Most have a combination of mandatory jurisdiction for some types of 
cases (such as death penalty cases) and discretionary jurisdiction for other types of cases.  Courts 
have different rules and norms for a range of practices, such as whether opinions must or need 
not be published.  No doubt courts have different internal cultures reflecting different attitudes 
toward dissenting, writing quickly or slowly, writing comprehensively or briefly, citing 
generously or minimally, and so forth.  Some high courts might benefit from the high quality 
work of lower courts, or suffer from their low quality work. 
 
 Two features of high courts have lately received a great deal of public and scholarly 
attention: their selection system and judicial pay.  The selection system refers to the method by 
which judges are selected and retained.  There are, roughly, three systems.  In appointments 
systems, the governor (sometimes the state legislature) appoints judges, sometimes with the 
advice of a commission.  In merit systems, a nonpartisan or bipartisan body selects judges; at the 
end of the judge’s term, a retention election (up or down vote) determines whether the judge has 
another term.  In electoral systems, judges are elected; these can be further divided into partisan 
and nonpartisan systems—in partisan systems, the judge’s party is put on the ballot.  Table 2 
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identifies the selection systems of all of the states as of 1998-2000, the period from which we 
take our data. 
 
Table 2: Selection Systems 
Appointed  
(A) 
Merit Selection  
(M) 
Non-Partisan Election 
(NE) 
Partisan Election  
(PE) 
Connecticut Alaska Georgia Alabama 
Delaware Arizona Idaho Arkansas 
Hawaii Colorado Kentucky Illinois 
Massachusetts Iowa Louisiana Mississippi 
Maine Indiana Michigan North Carolina 
New Hampshire Kansas Minnesota New Mexico 
New Jersey Maryland Montana Pennsylvania 
New York Missouri North Dakota Texas 
Rhode Island Nebraska Nevada West Virginia 
Vermont Oklahoma Ohio  
South Carolina South Dakota Oregon  
Virginia Utah Washington  
 Wyoming Wisconsin  
 California   
 Florida   
 Tennessee   
 
A further point is that judicial terms vary, from as little as 4 years to as much as 14 years, with 
lifetime tenure in three states.  Roughly speaking, appointed judges enjoy the longest tenure, 
merit selection judges the next longest, and elected judges the shortest tenure.  One might think 
of the four systems reflecting the degree to which the public directly affects the identify of 
judges: they have the least effect in appointment systems, the most effect in electoral system, 
with the merit system in between. 
 
 Judicial compensation also varies.  In 2007, the median income of high court judges was 
$149,200, and ranged from $106,185 to $209,521.38  The employment conditions of judges differ 
in other ways as well.  Judges enjoy different levels of secretarial and clerical support.  Roughly 
speaking, elected judges are paid less than appointed judges; they are also more likely to have 
graduated from a local law school. 
 
 Finally, we should mention the obvious fact that the mix of cases that reach high courts 
differs from state to state.  Some states are highly urban, others are not; some have certain types 
of industries that other lack; some have higher crime rates than others; and so on.  For this 
reason, comparison between the different high courts, and the judges who sit on them, is 
hazardous and complex. 
                                                 
38 National Center for State Courts, Survey of Judicial Salaries, 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_JudComJudSal070107Pub.pdf. 
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B.  Productivity 
 
 We begin with productivity.  Table 3 provides our results, ranked by opinion per year.  
The fourth column provides aggregate productivity (the total number of opinions); the last 
column provides a measure of efficiency—opinions per judge-year.  The two measures are 
highly correlated (correlation coefficient = 0.92; significant at the <1% level). 
 
Table 3: Number of Opinions 
Rank State Sel. 
System 
Opinions Judge 
Years 
Opinions/Year 
1 GA NE 1225 21 58.33 
2 MS PE 1437 29 49.55 
3 AR PE 1038 21 49.43 
4 AL PE 1417 30 47.23 
5 OH NE 989 21 47.10 
6 MT NE 968 21 46.10 
7 PA PE 941 21 44.81 
8 ND NE 703 16 43.94 
9 IN M 573 15 38.20 
10 WY M 548 15 36.53 
11 FL M 709 21 33.76 
12 CT A 707 23 30.74 
13 NE M 699 23 30.39 
14 ID NE 477 16 29.81 
15 IL PE 642 22 29.18 
16 CA M 605 21 28.81 
17 ME A 718 26 27.62 
18 MA A 608 23 26.43 
19 IA M 715 28 25.54 
20 AK M 446 18 24.78 
21 UT M 420 17 24.71 
22 SD M 366 15 24.40 
23 SC A 387 16 24.19 
24 MD M 523 22 23.77 
25 TN M 373 16 23.31 
26 WV PE 346 15 23.07 
27 KS M 483 21 23.00 
28 TX_CRIM PE 583 26 22.42 
29 LA NE 525 24 21.88 
30 NH A 366 17 21.53 
31 WA NE 578 28 20.64 
32 VA A 413 21 19.67 
33 MN NE 452 24 18.83 
34 KY NE 411 22 18.68 
35 WI NE 386 21 18.38 
36 VT A 274 15 18.27 
37 RI A 273 15 18.20 
38 NY A 380 22 17.27 
39 CO M 386 23 16.78 
40 MI NE 389 24 16.21 
41 OK_CIV M 435 28 15.54 
42 NV NE 259 18 14.39 
43 OK_CRIM M 230 16 14.38 
44 NJ A 376 27 13.93 
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45 TX_CIV PE 347 27 12.85 
46 HI A 225 18 12.50 
47 OR NE 245 21 11.67 
48 AZ M 172 15 11.47 
49 MO M 252 22 11.45 
50 NC PE 262 23 11.39 
51 DE A 163 15 10.87 
52 NM PE 151 15 10.07 
  
 
The striking result is that our top four—Georgia, Mississippi, Arkansas, Alabama—show up at 
the top of none of the earlier ranking studies using citations.  Mississippi, Arkansas, and 
Alabama do show up in the top ten of the Chamber of Commerce survey, suggesting that the 
senior lawyers who were surveyed might recognize that the courts of those states work hard.  
These traditionally overlooked states may deserve more credit.39 
 
C.  Citations 
 
 Table 4 provides out-of-state citations to majority opinions produced by a court.  The 
fourth column (Citations) provides a measure of the overall influence of the court; the last 
column (Citations/Year) provides a measure of efficiency, focusing on number of outside 
citations per judge-year.  The two measures are highly correlated (correlation coefficient = 0.89; 
significant at the <1% level). 
 
 At the top, California is far ahead of the other states in both total number of citations and 
citations per judge-year.  After California, there is more clustering, with Delaware, Montana and 
Washington being close together.  New York, a perennial star on citation counts does not appear 
in the top twenty (it is number 24), below states like Arkansas and South Carolina whose 
judiciaries have traditionally had weaker reputations.  Massachusetts though, another historically 
dominant state, remains among the top performers.      
 
     Table 4: Out-of-State Citations to Majority Opinions 
Rank State Sel. Type Citations Judge Years Citations/Year 
1 CA M 709 21 33.76 
2 DE A 336 15 22.40 
3 MT NE 468 21 22.29 
4 WA NE 611 28 21.82 
5 MA A 469 23 20.39 
6 MD M 448 22 20.36 
7 ND NE 316 16 19.75 
                                                 
39 A ready objection to using the number of published opinions is that some states have norms of producing and 
publishing short opinions and others use longer and more detailed opinions.  If one assumes that the shorter opinions 
involve less effort (a questionable, but plausible assumption), then the better measure of effort might be the number 
of published pages.  Alternatively, one could look at the number of West key cites which would provide a sense of 
the number of issues that opinion tackled (shorter and more routine opinions would have fewer West key cites).  
Unreported here, we calculated state rankings on each of these measures as well.  The rankings do change.  On the 
West key cite measure, for example, the top five states are South Carolina, Montana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and 
Georgia.  On the number of pages measure, the top states are Montana, Pennsylvania, California, Mississippi and 
Maryland.         
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8 KS M 388 21 18.48 
9 CT A 405 23 17.61 
10 NJ A 474 27 17.56 
11 CO M 382 23 16.61 
12 IN M 244 15 16.27 
13 NE M 371 23 16.13 
14 IL PE 354 22 16.09 
15 AR PE 337 21 16.05 
16 OH NE 337 21 16.05 
17 PA PE 336 21 16.00 
18 SC A 245 16 15.31 
19 AK M 273 18 15.17 
20 TN M 242 16 15.13 
21 IA M 403 28 14.39 
22 WV PE 206 15 13.73 
23 VT A 206 15 13.73 
24 NY A 301 22 13.68 
25 MN NE 321 24 13.38 
26 NH A 225 17 13.24 
27 SD M 196 15 13.07 
28 GA NE 262 21 12.48 
29 AZ M 187 15 12.47 
30 VA A 261 21 12.43 
31 WY M 184 15 12.27 
32 WI NE 256 21 12.19 
33 MS PE 322 29 11.10 
34 ME A 284 26 10.92 
35 AL PE 325 30 10.83 
36 FL M 208 21 9.90 
37 NM PE 143 15 9.53 
38 ID NE 148 16 9.25 
39 TX_CIV PE 243 27 9.00 
40 RI A 131 15 8.73 
41 NV NE 157 18 8.72 
42 MI NE 208 24 8.67 
43 HI A 150 18 8.33 
44 UT M 134 17 7.88 
45 NC PE 170 23 7.39 
46 LA NE 159 24 6.63 
47 KY NE 145 22 6.59 
48 OR NE 137 21 6.52 
49 OK_CIV M 160 28 5.71 
50 MO M 115 22 5.23 
51 TX_CRIM PE 105 26 4.04 
52 OK_CRIM M 59 16 3.69 
 
 
Next, we compare our top ten states with those of the roughly contemporary citation studies, and 
the Chamber of Commerce survey measure of competence. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Influence Rankings  
Top 10 Performers    
Our Citation Results 2000 Comparato citation 
ranking  
1998-2000 Dear & Jessen 
“followed”  citations 
2002 Chamber of 
Commerce Survey – 
Judges’ Competence 
California California California Delaware 
Delaware New York Washington Washington 
Montana Minnesota Nebraska Virginia 
Washington Pennsylvania Kansas Iowa 
Massachusetts Colorado Massachusetts Minnesota 
Maryland Michigan Connecticut Colorado 
North Dakota Washington Montana Arizona 
Kansas Illinois Iowa Connecticut 
Connecticut New Jersey Maryland New York 
New Jersey Wisconsin Texas-Civil Wisconsin 
    
Bottom 10 Performers    
Our Citation Results 2000 Comparato citation 
ranking  
1998-2000 Dear & Jessen 
“followed”  citations 
2002 Chamber of 
Commerce Survey – 
Judges’ Competence 
Hawaii Texas Idaho S. Carolina 
Utah Louisiana Arizona Kentucky 
North Carolina West Virginia Utah Hawaii 
Louisiana Rhode Island Delaware Arkansas 
Kentucky North Dakota  Louisiana Texas 
Oregon Tennessee  Oregon Montana 
Oklahoma Civil Nevada Kentucky W. Virginia 
Missouri Alaska Hawaii Louisiana 
Texas Criminal Maine New Mexico Alabama 
Oklahoma Criminal Vermont Missouri Mississippi 
    
Correl. Coeff. between 
Our Citation Results and 
the underlying score for 
each Influence Ranking 0.388 0.565 0.280 
p-value* 0.005 0.000 0.049 
    
Spearman Rank Coeff. 
between Our Citation 
Result Ranking and each 
Influence Ranking 0.184 0.555 0.311 
p-value** 0.201 0.000 0.028 
*p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the null hypothesis there is no correlation. 
**p-value is from a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the two rankings in question are independent 
 
Our results overlap with the results of all three studies, more so with the two academic citation 
studies.  The correlation coefficients between our outside citation measure and the underlying 
scores behind each of the three other rankings in Table 5 are all positive and significant.  The 
Spearman rank coefficient between our citation ranking and the three other rankings, similarly, is 
positive (although significant only for the Dear & Jessen and Chamber of Commerce rankings).  
Washington appears on all three lists.  Our study and the Chamber of Commerce survey also 
overlap with Delaware, Washington, and Connecticut.  Further, Delaware shows up high on both 
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our study and the Chamber of Commerce study and not at all in the other lists.  And our list and 
Dear and Jessen’s include Montana, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. 
 
Delaware does even better on our citation rankings (moving to a clear first place) when 
we separate out the common law and commercial law cases (see Appendix A) – the types of 
cases that business lawyers likely care the most about.  That suggests that, at least with respect to 
Delaware, the business lawyers surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce, might recognize the 
merits of the Delaware court that are captured in our ranking.  That said, California is second in 
the citation ranking even when we separate out the common law and commercial law cases and 
that is quite different from the Chamber of Commerce ranking that puts California in the bottom 
half of states (ranked 28th for judicial competence). 
 
At the bottom of the rankings, there is more overlap between our rankings and the 
Chamber of Commerce study.  While the Chamber of Commerce ranks our best performer 
(California) in the bottom half of their rankings, our two rankings share a number of states at the 
bottom (including Kentucky, Hawaii, Texas, and Louisiana).  There is also a correspondence 
between our rankings and the two other citation-based measures.    
 
D.  Independence 
 
 Table 6 provides data on the independence of the courts.  Note that several courts receive 
no score because of insufficient data.  Rhode Island dominates the rankings.  It is a state whose 
judiciary has not traditionally ranked high on citation counts, perhaps because of its small size 
and the presence of its dominant neighbor, Massachusetts.  But it scores well above the majority 
of states on the independence measure.  New York also scores high along with another state that 
does not traditionally do well on citation counts, Oregon.  
 
Table 6: Average Independence Score     
 Rank State Sel. Type Independence 
1 RI A 0.19 
2 NY A 0.15 
3 OR NE 0.13 
4 UT M 0.10 
5 OK_CIV M 0.09 
6 NH A 0.06 
7 TX_CIV PE 0.04 
8 OH NE 0.03 
9 MS PE 0.03 
10 IL PE 0.03 
11 AR PE 0.03 
12 WV PE 0.03 
13 AZ M 0.02 
14 NE M 0.02 
15 TN M 0.01 
16 FL M 0.01 
17 LA NE 0.01 
18 ND NE 0.01 
19 CA M 0.00 
20 SD M N/A 
21 NM PE N/A 
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22 MD M N/A 
23 GA NE N/A 
24 SC A N/A 
25 MA A -0.00 
26 VT A -0.00 
27 KS M -0.01 
28 IA M -0.02 
29 WA NE -0.03 
30 PA PE -0.03 
31 TX_CRIM PE -0.03 
32 MN NE -0.04 
33 NJ A -0.04 
34 HI A -0.04 
35 KY NE -0.05 
36 NV NE -0.05 
37 MT NE -0.06 
38 ME A -0.07 
39 CO M -0.07 
40 AL PE -0.08 
41 VA A -0.08 
42 WY M -0.09 
43 AK M -0.09 
44 DE A -0.12 
45 NC PE -0.13 
46 OK_CRIM M -0.14 
47 MO M -0.14 
48 ID NE -0.15 
49 WI NE -0.16 
50 CT A -0.18 
51 IN M -0.21 
52 MI NE -0.31 
Note: N/A means no score because court lacks partisan diversity. 
 
 Comparing our results to the Chamber of Commerce’s 2002 survey of judicial  
impartiality, we see no correlation between our underlying Independence scores and the Judge 
Impartiality scores reported in the 2002 Survey (correlation coefficient = -0.1810; not 
significant).40  States the Chamber of Commerce ranks high, like Delaware, Colorado, 
Wisconsin, Virginia, and Connecticut, show up nearer the bottom in our Independence rankings.  
Table 7 shows our rankings for the top ten of the Chamber of Commerce survey with respect to 
judicial impartiality. 
 
Table 7: Comparison of Independence Rankings 
2002 Chamber of Commerce Survey –  
Top 10 for Judges’ Impartiality 
Our rankings 
Delaware 44 
Colorado 39 
Washington 29 
Iowa 28 
Wisconsin 49 
Connecticut 50 
                                                 
40 See 2002 U.S. Chamber of Commerce States Liability Systems Ranking Study, supra, at 25.  We also calculate 
the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient = -0.1576 (p-value of two-sided test of null hypothesis that the two are 
independent = 0.2745). 
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Nebraska 14 
Oregon 3 
Virginia 41 
Minnesota 32 
 
The lack of correlation may reflect the difference in methodologies.  The Chamber of 
Commerce survey reveals whether senior lawyers at wealthy corporations think that the courts 
are impartial, whereas we examine whether judges are influenced by partisan considerations.  
Suppose that Republican judges tend to favor business interests and that the lawyers believe that 
decisions that favor business interests are “impartial.”  If so, those lawyers would give high 
grades to courts dominated by Republican judges who vote together, whereas those courts would 
receive low independence scores because of partisan voting.  There are other, more innocent 
explanations for the lack of correlation.  The Chamber of Commerce survey asks for evaluations 
of the entire judiciary, whereas we examine the high courts.  Lawyers face trial judges more than 
high court judges, and therefore their impartiality rankings might reflect the performance of the 
former rather than the latter. 
 
E.  Composite Measures 
 
 There are a number of ways of aggregating our measures.  We begin with Table 8, which 
provides a composite measure that gives identical weightings to each of the three measures. 
 
Table 8: Equal Weight Composite Ranking (All Subject Matter Areas) 
State Standard Dev. 
of Total 
Opinion Score 
Standard Dev. 
of Outside 
Citation Score 
Standard Dev. 
of Indep Score 
Equal Weight 
Composite 
Score 
CA 0.294 3.661 0.389 1.448 
AR 2.006 0.500 0.654 1.053 
ND 1.550 1.160 0.427 1.046 
MT 1.729 1.613 -0.317 1.008 
OH 1.812 0.500 0.697 1.003 
GA 2.746 -0.138 0.009 0.872 
MS 2.016 -0.383 0.669 0.767 
PA 1.623 0.491 -0.005 0.703 
MA 0.097 1.275 0.323 0.565 
NE 0.425 0.514 0.593 0.511 
IL 0.325 0.507 0.660 0.497 
NY -0.664 0.077 1.984 0.466 
WA -0.384 1.530 0.043 0.396 
MD -0.124 1.270 0.009 0.385 
RI -0.587 -0.806 2.525 0.377 
KS -0.188 0.933 0.209 0.318 
AL 1.824 -0.431 -0.587 0.269 
NH -0.311 -0.002 0.992 0.226 
TN -0.162 0.335 0.488 0.220 
FL 0.705 -0.597 0.456 0.188 
WV -0.183 0.086 0.652 0.185 
UT -0.047 -0.958 1.437 0.144 
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IA 0.022 0.204 0.138 0.122 
SC -0.090 0.368 0.009 0.096 
WY 0.935 -0.175 -0.656 0.035 
SD -0.072 -0.033 0.009 -0.032 
VT -0.581 0.086 0.313 -0.061 
NJ -0.942 0.769 -0.074 -0.082 
AK -0.041 0.342 -0.690 -0.129 
IN 1.074 0.539 -2.041 -0.143 
CT 0.454 0.778 -1.670 -0.146 
DE -1.196 1.633 -0.987 -0.183 
OR -1.129 -1.200 1.757 -0.191 
CO -0.705 0.600 -0.474 -0.193 
MN -0.534 0.023 -0.071 -0.194 
AZ -1.146 -0.140 0.620 -0.222 
ME 0.195 -0.415 -0.465 -0.228 
OK_CIV -0.808 -1.345 1.315 -0.279 
TX_CIV -1.031 -0.758 0.818 -0.324 
LA -0.282 -1.182 0.438 -0.342 
VA -0.465 -0.146 -0.600 -0.404 
ID 0.377 -0.714 -1.346 -0.561 
TX_CRIM -0.236 -1.644 -0.012 -0.631 
NM -1.262 -0.663 0.009 -0.639 
KY -0.547 -1.188 -0.193 -0.643 
NV -0.903 -0.808 -0.248 -0.653 
HI -1.060 -0.877 -0.092 -0.676 
WI -0.572 -0.189 -1.423 -0.728 
NC -1.152 -1.046 -1.139 -1.112 
MO -1.147 -1.432 -1.226 -1.268 
OK_CRIM -0.905 -1.707 -1.223 -1.278 
MI -0.752 -0.818 -3.102 -1.557 
Note: For each measure (total opinions per judge year, outside citations per judge year, 
and independence) we compute the standard deviation from the mean of the sample for 
each state.  For those states without an independence score, we substitute the mean 
independence score for the other states in computing the standard deviation.  We then 
combine the three standard deviation scores with equal weights to generate the equal 
weighted composite score. 
 
California comes out at the top, as it has in other academic studies.  More surprisingly, Arkansas 
comes in second. 
 
 However, there is no reason to think that each measure should receive equal weighting.  
Table 9 provides a triangle chart that varies the weight that is given to each of the three different 
measures.  At each apex, the measure in bracket is given sole weight and the other measures are 
given zero.  Between the apexes, the measures are given the weights in parentheses (in the order 
of quality, productivity, independence).  For example, if you give equal weight to productivity 
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and independence, and no weight to quality, then the top five states are Georgia, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Ohio, and North Dakota.41 
 
 
                                                 
41 Weighting choices matter more for the independence measure, which is uncorrelated with quality and 
productivity; quality and productivity have a correlation coefficient of 0.3. 
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Table 9: Linear Combinations of Quality, Productivity, and Independence 
For All Subject Matter Areas 
(Quality, Productivity, Independence) 
 
 
            [Productivity] 
GA, MS, AR, 
AL, OH 
(1,0,0) 
 
     
    GA, MT, AR,            GA, MS, AR, 
    OH, ND            OH, ND 
    (.75,.25,0)           (.75,0,.25) 
      GA, AR, OH, 
      MS, MT 
CA, MT, ND,  (.67,.16,.16)   GA, MS, AR, 
 GA, AR       OH, ND 
         (.5,.5,0)       (.5,0,.5) 
    CA, MT, ND,            AR, GA, OH, 
    AR, GA             MS, ND 
 (.42,.42,.16) CA, AR, ND,  (.42,.16,.42) 
      MT, OH 
 CA, MT, ND,    (.33,.33,.33)        RI, NY, UT, 
 WA, MA  CA, MT, ND,                      RI, NY, CA,       OR, MS 
     (.25,.75,0)  WA, MA                      AR, OH      (.25,0,.75) 
    (.16,.67,.16) CA, ND, MT,       (.16,.16,.67) 
      AR, OH 
      (.16,.42,.42) 
 
CA, DE, MT,             CA, WA, MT,  CA, NY, RI           RI, NY, CA,       RI, NY, OR 
WA, MA  MA, DE   MA, ND           OR, UT        UT, OK_CIV 
(0,1,0)   (0,.75,.25)  (0,.5,.5)            (0,.25,.75)         (0,0,1) 
[Quality]               [Independence] 
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Table 10:  Top Ranking States (From Table 9) 
 
State Number of #1 
Rankings 
Number of #1 to #3 
Rankings 
Number of #1 to #5 
Rankings 
Common Law 
Cases (Number 
of #1 to-#3 
Rankings) 
AR 1 7 11 5 
CA 9 11 11 5 
ND 0 6 11 0 
MT 0 8 10 1 
OH 0 2 9 0 
GA 5 6 8 0 
MS 0 3 6 9 
MA 0 0 5 0 
NY 0 5 5 8 
RI 4 5 5 7 
WA 0 1 4 0 
OR 0 1 3 2 
UT 0 1 3 4 
DE 0 1 2 4 
AL 0 0 1 11 
OK_CIV 0 0 1 0 
MD 0 0 0 1 
 
 No state emerges as a clear winner, but a strong case can be made that California has the 
best high court.  It has the most #1 rankings on the triangle chart, and the most #1-3 rankings, 
and is tied for the most #1-5 rankings.  (See Table 10.)  The top contenders are Arkansas, North 
Dakota, Montana, and Georgia.  If one focuses on common law cases, where arguably state-
specific factors should play the smallest role, then Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Alabama emerge as the top states.  The strong performance of southern states is a bit of a 
surprise. 
 
 Compare our overall composite rankings with the three most recent studies, the 2000 
Comparato study, the 2007 Dear & Jessen study, and the 2002 Chamber of Commerce survey 
(overall rankings). 
 
Table 11: Comparison of Rankings of Courts 
Best Performers    
Our study--composite 2000 Comparato citation 
ranking  
1998-2000 Dear & Jessen 
“followed”  citations 
2002 Chamber of 
Commerce Survey – 
Overall Score 
Arkansas California California Delaware 
California New York Washington Virginia 
North Dakota Minnesota Nebraska Washington 
Montana Pennsylvania Kansas Kansas 
Ohio Colorado Massachusetts Iowa 
Georgia Michigan Connecticut Nebraska 
Mississippi Washington Montana Colorado 
Massachusetts Illinois Iowa Utah 
Rhode Island New Jersey Maryland South Dakota 
New York Wisconsin Texas Connecticut 
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Correl. Coeff. between 
Our Composite Results 
and the underlying score 
for each Ranking 0.139 0.673 -0.158 
p-value* 0.335 0.000 0.275 
    
Spearman Rank Coeff. 
between Our Composite 
Result Ranking and each 
Ranking 0.030 0.629 -0.132 
p-value** 0.835 0.000 0.362 
 
 Our equally-weighted composite measure is not correlated with the Comparato or 
Chamber of Commerce rankings (indeed, if anything, our rankings are negatively correlated with 
the Chamber of Commerce rankings).  Only the Dear & Jessen rankings are positively correlated 
with our composite measure.   
  
When quality measures are broadened through the use of our composite measure, several 
southern states—Arkansas, Georgia, and Mississippi—appear on the top ten list.  Perhaps, judges 
sitting on the high courts of these states think of their judicial role more in terms of deciding 
disputes, and less in terms of crafting high-quality opinions.42  An alternative view is that 
cultural differences between southern and non-southern states are great enough that courts do not 
cite courts from the other region as much as they cite courts from their own region, in which case 
the greater number of northern states produces a bias in the citation measure.  If this is so, then 
the prior citation studies have undervalued the courts of the southern states. 
 
 As discussed in a prior article, elected judges tend to write more opinions, while 
appointed judges tend to write more-cited opinions.43  The influence of the selection system, 
then, might also explain why southern states—where electoral systems are more common—do 
well under our composite measure.  Different states, as a function of their selection systems, 
appear to focus on different aspects of the judicial task.  Citations capture but an aspect of that, 
as do surveys of corporate lawyers.  Our goal is to improve on the existing rankings by providing 
a broader set of measures than prior rankings.  The broadening of measures enables us to capture 
more aspects of the job than the prior rankings have.    
 
   
IV.  Digging Deeper: Ranking Courts While Controlling for State-Specific Factors 
 
 One possible objection to our rankings is that we do not control for state-specific factors.  
Suppose, for example, that the Montana high court is more productive than the California high 
court (both in the aggregate, and per judge) because cases in Montana are simpler.  Montana is a 
less populous, less commercially complex, more homogenous state, and it is possible that in such 
states cases can be resolved quickly.  Controlling for the complexity of the legal environment, it 
might turn out that the California court is in fact more productive than the Montana court. 
 
                                                 
42 Cf. Choi, Gulati, & Posner, Professionals or Politicians, supra. 
43 Id. 
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 To control for state-specific factors, we computed what we call “abnormal” rankings.  
For each of our three measures of performance, we estimated an ordinary least squares model 
using the performance measure as the dependent variable, and state-level controls for the age of 
the state, the log of the population, the log of the aggregate population of neighboring states, 
crime rate, median age of the population, log of gross state product, and median income level for 
1997 (defined in Appendix C).  We computed predicted scores for each measure using the model 
and then calculated the difference between the actual and predicted scores.  We term this residual 
the “abnormal” score for the performance measure per judge-year.  The details of our 
computation method and the abnormal rankings for each of the three performance measures are 
in Appendix B.  Table 12 displays the triangle diagram for our composite measure. 
 
 
Table 12: Linear Combinations of Quality, Productivity, and Independence 
For All Subject Matter Areas using Abnormal Rankings 
(Quality, Productivity, Independence) 
 
 
            [Productivity] 
GA, OH, AR, 
PA, MT 
(1,0,0) 
 
     
    GA, OH, AR,            GA, OH, AR, 
    MT, PA            PA, ND 
    (.75,.25,0)           (.75,0,.25) 
      GA, OH, AR, 
      MT, PA 
CA, MT, AR,  (.67,.16,.16)   GA, OH, AR, 
 GA, OH       PA, NE 
         (.5,.5,0)       (.5,0,.5) 
    CA, MT, AR,            OH, GA, AR, 
    GA, OH             PA, CA 
 (.42,.42,.16) CA, AR, OH,  (.42,.16,.42) 
      MT, GA 
 CA, MT, AR,    (.33,.33,.33)          NY, OK_CIV, OR, 
 ND, WA  CA, MT, AR,                  NY, OK_CIV, NH,   NH, RI 
     (.25,.75,0)  WA, ND                  NE, OH        (.25,0,.75) 
    (.16,.67,.16) CA, AR, MT,   (.16,.16,.67) 
      OH, NE 
      (.16,.42,.42) 
 
CA, MT, DE,             CA, MT, WA,  CA, KS, NE      NY, OK_CIV, NH,    OK_CIV, NY, NH 
WA, AR  KS, AR   WA, AR      CA, NE             RI, OR 
(0,1,0)   (0,.75,.25)  (0,.5,.5)       (0,.25,.75)                   (0,0,1) 
[Quality]                         [Independence] 
 
 
 We do not control for state court characteristics (such as judge selection system, number 
of clerks, and so on) in our abnormal rankings.  We treat these variables, unlike the state-specific 
factors, as part of the choice set available to a state in designing its state court system.  The 
abnormal rankings therefore give a measure of how well a state is doing based on its own court-
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system related choices, while controlling for factors out of the control of a state-level 
decisionmaker (such as state population).   
 
 Visual inspection of Table 12 reveals that the composite results do not differ much from 
our “normal” rankings, and indeed the correlation coefficients for each of the rankings are very 
high (correlation coefficient = 0.8548; significant at the <1% level) (see Appendix B).  
California has the highest number of number one rankings under both our original composite 
rankings (see Table 9) and our abnormal composite rankings in Table 12. 
 
 
V.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Study: Some Observations 
 
 Last, we return to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce surveys.  Why do its results differ so 
much from ours?  The simple answer is that we measure different things.  Our study measures 
productivity, influence/quality, and independence.  The Chamber of Commerce surveys senior 
lawyers at corporations that have annual revenues of at least $100 million.  The obvious problem 
with the Chamber of Commerce survey is that the attitudes of business lawyers probably tell us 
more about the value of a judicial system for business than about its overall quality.44 
 
To probe these differences, we ran regressions of the Chamber of Commerce 2002 
overall scores and rankings on various state and court variables.  We use an ordinary least 
squares model where the dependent variable is the Chamber of Commerce overall score for a 
state and an ordered logit where the dependent variable is the ordinal overall rank.  We include a 
set of variables to assess the importance of politics in the ranking: Republican Governor (defined 
to equal 1 if the governor is Republican and 0 otherwise); Legis. Republican (defined to equal 1 
if the legislature is controlled by Republicans); and Legis. Democrat (defined to equal 1 if the 
legislature is controlled by Democrats).  We use legislatures with split control between 
Democrats and Republicans as the base category for Legis. Republican and Legis. Democrat.  
We also include Common Law, defined as the number of property, torts, and commercial law 
opinions divided by all opinions for a particular state from 1998 to 2000.  The Chamber of 
Commerce survey may look more favorably on states that focus their attention on private law 
issues important to the business constituency of the Chamber.  For state-level variables, we use 
the same variables we used in our abnormal performance model discussed above.   
 
We also add a number of court-level variables.  We include an indicator variable for 
whether the state selects high court judges through partisan election, non-partisan election, or 
merit selection (with appointment states as the base category).  We include measures for the 
average high court associate justice salary (Adjusted Associate Justice Salary) and the average 
partner salary in the state (Adjusted Partner Salary).  The salary variables are adjusted for the 
cost of living for the metro area in which the high court is located in the state.  We include an 
indicator variable for whether the judges on the high court remained the same throughout our 
sample time period from 1998 to 2000 (Stable Court) and the size of the bench during the 1998 
to 2000 period (Number of Active Judges on Bench).  We include an indicator variable for 
whether the judges in a specific court do not face mandatory retirement (No Mandatory 
                                                 
44 For related criticisms of U.S. Chamber of Commerce studies, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, 
Lawsuit Climates, and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W.Va. L. Rev. 1 (2008). 
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Retirement).  As a measure of resources available to high court judges, we include the average 
number of clerks per judge for the 1998 to 2000 period (Number of Clerks Per Judge) and an 
indicator variable for whether the clerks are tenured for at least one year (Long-Term Clerk).   To 
capture the opportunity cost of being a law clerk, the difference between the average salary of an 
entering associate at law firm in that state and the law clerk salary is used (Law Clerk 
Opportunity Cost).  We include the log of the number of trial cases in the state measured in 1998 
(ln(Number of Trial Cases in the State)) and an indicator variable for the presence of an 
intermediate appellate court (Intermediate Appellate Court).  Specific court rules may affect the 
workload facing judges, thereby affecting the level of judicial output.  We lastly include an 
indicator variable for whether judges face a mandatory publication rule (Mandatory Publication). 
(Variable definitions are in Appendix C.)  Table 13 provides the results. 
 
 
Table 13: Chamber of Commerce Models 
 Model 1 
OLS 
Model 2 
OLS 
Model 3 
Ordered 
Logit 
Model 4 
Ordered 
Logit 
Dependent Variable CC Score CC Score CC Rank CC Rank 
Independent Variables     
Republican Governor 0.005 0.051 -0.223 -0.249 
 (0.06) (0.33) (-0.36) (-0.22) 
Legis. Republican 0.030 -0.018 0.334 -0.031 
 (0.28) (-0.17) (0.45) (-0.03) 
Legis. Democrat -0.216* -0.037 1.591* 0.345 
 (-2.14) (-0.24) (2.22) (0.27) 
Common Law 0.487 1.164** -6.720* -20.279** 
 (0.89) (3.10) (-2.17) (-4.54) 
State Age 0.004+ 0.005* -0.015 -0.043* 
 (1.77) (2.54) (-1.26) (-2.47) 
ln(State Population) -0.833 -0.801+ 5.281 11.941* 
 (-1.68) (-2.03) (1.61) (2.39) 
ln(Pop. in Border States) 0.075 -0.045 -0.739+ -0.505 
 (1.18) (-0.63) (-1.76) (-0.74) 
Crime Index 0.000* 0.000* -0.001+ -0.001* 
 (2.10) (2.16) (-1.94) (-2.49) 
Median Age of Population 0.012 0.026 -0.159 -0.272 
 (0.48) (1.03) (-0.95) (-1.15) 
ln(Gross State Product) 0.754 0.726* -4.712 -11.435* 
 (1.53) (2.15) (-1.46) (-2.47) 
State Median Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.70) (1.17) (-1.3) (-1.58) 
Black Pop. Fraction -2.477* -2.664** 14.197* 34.060** 
 (-2.47) (-3.31) (2.38) (3.48) 
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Citizen Ideology Score -0.004 -0.004 0.058+ 0.082+ 
 (-0.81) (-1.02) (1.83) (1.78) 
Election Partisan  0.098  -0.237 
  (0.51)  (-0.17) 
Election Non-Partisan  0.238+  -1.828 
  (1.79)  (-1.21) 
Merit Plan  0.199  -3.388* 
  (1.51)  (-2.40) 
Adj. Associate Justice Salary  0.000  0.003 
  (-0.19)  (0.67) 
Adjusted Partner Salary  0.000  -0.002+ 
  (1.40)  (-1.73) 
Stable Court  -0.058  -1.075 
  (-0.65)  (-0.99) 
Number of Active Judges  -0.083**  0.857* 
  (-2.87)  (2.07) 
No Mandatory Retirement  0.126  -1.826 
  (1.10)  (-1.41) 
Long-Term Clerk  0.012  0.262 
  (0.14)  (0.34) 
Number of Clerks Per Judge  -0.262**  3.764** 
  (-3.83)  (4.51) 
Law Clerk Opportunity Cost  -0.004+  0.068* 
  (-2.07)  (2.56) 
ln(Trial Cases in the State)  0.162*  -2.198* 
  (2.68)  (-2.52) 
Intermediate Appellate Court  0.094  -0.444 
  (0.42)  (-0.24) 
Mandatory Publication  -0.002  -1.092 
  (-0.02)  (-0.99) 
Constant -7.360 -9.139*   
 (-1.66) (-2.52)   
N 50 49 50 49 
Adjusted R2 or Pseudo R2 0.487 0.721 0.113 0.278 
 
 
Models 1 and 2 use the raw Chamber of Commerce score (from 0 to 4, best), while Models 3 and 
4 use the Chamber of Commerce ranking (from 1, best, to 50).  Because high scores are good 
and low ranks are bad, the coefficients should have opposite signs (and they do).  Models 1 and 3 
control for state-specific factors only; models 2 and 4 control for court-specific factors as well. 
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 The following types of states do worse in Chamber of Commerce surveys: those with 
Democratic legislatures (in Models 1 and 3);45 those with fewer common law cases (as a 
proportion of all cases); younger states; more populous states; poorer states; states with larger 
African-American populations; and states with more liberal populations (in Models 3 and 4).  As 
for institutional factors, states with more active judges do worse; so do states with more law 
clerks; and so do states with fewer trials. 
 
 A study by Russell Sobel and Joshua Hall runs a similar regression but finds that states 
with electoral systems have the lowest Chamber of Commerce ratings.46  We suspect that the 
difference is attributable to our inclusion of a large number of control variables that are 
correlated with the type of selection system (they also used Chamber of Commerce ratings from 
2004, whereas we used 2002 ratings).  They also found that Republican-controlled state supreme 
courts during their period had a higher judicial quality rating than Democratic-controlled state 
supreme courts. 
 
 It is not surprising that business lawyers do not like the judicial systems in more liberal 
and poorer states.  No doubt in such states populist tendencies affect the performance of judges, 
or result in the appointment or election of judges who place less weight on the interests of large 
businesses than judges in more conservative, commercial, or wealthier states.  But this is not the 
same thing as saying that states that do poorly on the Chamber of Commerce surveys have bad 
judicial systems. 
 
 Unlike the Chamber of Commerce rankings, our objective measures provide 
transparency.   Consumers of our ranking are able to determine the constituent components of 
our rankings (number of opinions per judge year, outside citations per judge year, and 
independence) and pick and choose among them according to their own preferences (such as in 
our triangle charts above).  The Chamber of Commerce, in contrast, depends on surveys and 
therefore indirectly incorporates the biases of those being surveyed.  The Chamber of Commerce 
rankings consequently do not provide much transparency; rather, the respondents of the survey 
are much like a black box.  Without transparency, those factors that underlay the Chamber of 
Commerce rankings may very well not match the preferences of those who utilize state court 
rankings (such as legislators determining whether to pay the state judges more or an electorate 
determining whether to vote for judges of a particular state court).  The Chamber of Commerce 
may rank judges with more expertise at common law cases higher than judges with more 
expertise on public law cases; the users of the rankings, however, may care greatly about how 
public law cases are determined.  Moreover, outside of academic articles (such as ours) the 
magnitude of this tendency within the Chamber of Commerce rankings may not be readily 
apparent.   
 
 Our measures also serve an information-forcing function.  Our overall composite 
rankings are different from the Chamber of Commerce overall rankings.  Indeed, they are 
                                                 
45 Democratic legislatures do worse compared with the base category of split legislatures in Models 1 and 3.  The 
coefficient on Legis. Democrat loses significance however once state court level controls are added.  In addition, the 
difference between Legis. Democrat and Legis. Republican is significant at the 10% level for Model 1 (although the 
difference is insignificant in the other models).  
46 Sobel & Hall, supra at 75. 
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negatively correlated.  The presence of this discrepancy naturally leads to the question: why the 
difference?  We’ve attempted an answer in this section, determining the factors that correlate 
with the Chamber of Commerce rankings.  Our hope is that our study will shift the burden to the 
Chamber of Commerce to explain and justify their rankings more fully.  Why is it that California 
does so well in our rankings (and other academic rankings), but does so poorly in the Chamber of 
Commerce ranking (with an overall ranking of 45th out of 50 states)? 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Many people are uncomfortable with rankings.  They argue that rankings unavoidably 
disregard important aspects of the ranked institution’s performance and encourage people to 
compete with respect to only measurable aspects of performance.  Competitions to perform well 
on rankings then result in a downward spiral as institutions neglect important but hard-to-
measure aspects of their missions in order to improve their rank. 
 
 We agree that rankings can be misused, but as far as state courts are concerned, the genie 
is out of the bottle.  Given the dominance of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce surveys, and 
significant questions about their usefulness, new rankings should be encouraged rather than 
shunned.  The challenge is to construct performance measures that are useful and accurate.  We 
have built on earlier work, and have no doubt that others will be able to improve on our 
measures. 
 
 We have presented our rankings cautiously, recognizing that readers will weight aspects 
of judicial performance differently.  We urge readers to treat the rankings as an information-
forcing device.  Assume that a low ranking creates a prima facie case that a state high court is 
low-quality, but allow its defenders to advance arguments as to why special circumstances may 
account for the court’s performance.  If the explanation rings false, then it might be a good idea 
to urge reform.  And courts, other scholars, and other interested parties should feel free to 
develop their own rankings.  Competition to develop rankings should lead to greater information 
about courts.  Concern about neglect for difficult-to-measure aspects of performance should 
encourage scholars to develop new measurement instruments, such as surveys that are distributed 
to a more representative sample of the population than those financed by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce.  If multiple rankings converge, then the case for reform of states high courts that 
repeatedly appear at the bottom will be strengthened. 
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Appendix A: Common Law Areas Only 
 
Number of Opinions (Common Law Areas Only) 
State Sel. System Opinions Judge Years Opinions/Year 
AL PE 860 30 28.667 
MS PE 502 29 17.310 
AR PE 304 21 14.476 
MT NE 289 21 13.762 
PA PE 284 21 13.524 
GA NE 282 21 13.429 
ID NE 214 16 13.375 
OH NE 276 21 13.143 
ME A 340 26 13.077 
UT M 211 17 12.412 
NE M 266 23 11.565 
VA A 236 21 11.238 
ND NE 170 16 10.625 
WY M 158 15 10.533 
SD M 153 15 10.200 
AK M 157 18 8.722 
CT A 199 23 8.652 
IA M 232 28 8.286 
TX_CIV PE 211 27 7.815 
LA NE 183 24 7.625 
MD M 166 22 7.545 
WI NE 157 21 7.476 
RI A 112 15 7.467 
NY A 159 22 7.227 
CA M 150 21 7.143 
NH A 120 17 7.059 
MI NE 166 24 6.917 
WV PE 102 15 6.800 
IN M 99 15 6.600 
IL PE 143 22 6.500 
WA NE 180 28 6.429 
VT A 96 15 6.400 
OK_CIV M 179 28 6.393 
KS M 132 21 6.286 
MN NE 150 24 6.250 
SC A 90 16 5.625 
FL M 112 21 5.333 
KY NE 111 22 5.045 
CO M 115 23 5.000 
MA A 114 23 4.957 
MO M 103 22 4.682 
HI A 83 18 4.611 
NJ A 121 27 4.481 
TN M 69 16 4.313 
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DE A 61 15 4.067 
OR NE 77 21 3.667 
NC PE 84 23 3.652 
NV NE 59 18 3.278 
NM PE 35 15 2.333 
AZ M 29 15 1.933 
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Out-of-State Citations to Majority Opinions (Common Law Areas Only) 
State Sel. System Citations Judge Years Citations/Year 
DE A 246 15 16.400 
CA M 247 21 11.762 
MD M 205 22 9.318 
WA NE 237 28 8.464 
MT NE 170 21 8.095 
NY A 175 22 7.955 
AL PE 237 30 7.900 
VA A 163 21 7.762 
NJ A 205 27 7.593 
ND NE 119 16 7.438 
IA M 188 28 6.714 
CT A 153 23 6.652 
CO M 151 23 6.565 
TX_CIV PE 176 27 6.519 
IL PE 138 22 6.273 
OH NE 130 21 6.190 
WV PE 92 15 6.133 
PA PE 126 21 6.000 
KS M 125 21 5.952 
IN M 89 15 5.933 
AR PE 120 21 5.714 
MA A 131 23 5.696 
AK M 101 18 5.611 
SD M 81 15 5.400 
SC A 84 16 5.250 
ME A 134 26 5.154 
MN NE 123 24 5.125 
WI NE 104 21 4.952 
TN M 77 16 4.813 
NE M 110 23 4.783 
FL M 98 21 4.667 
WY M 69 15 4.600 
MS PE 131 29 4.517 
UT M 74 17 4.353 
ID NE 67 16 4.188 
MI NE 99 24 4.125 
HI A 74 18 4.111 
RI A 61 15 4.067 
VT A 57 15 3.800 
NH A 62 17 3.647 
AZ M 52 15 3.467 
NM PE 49 15 3.267 
OR NE 68 21 3.238 
NV NE 58 18 3.222 
GA NE 65 21 3.095 
OK_CIV M 84 28 3.000 
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NC PE 65 23 2.826 
LA NE 59 24 2.458 
MO M 51 22 2.318 
KY NE 37 22 1.682 
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Common Law Only Equal Weight Composite Ranking 
State Standard Dev. 
of Total 
Opinion Score 
Standard Dev. 
of Outside 
Citation Score 
Standard Dev. 
of Indep Score 
Equal Weight 
Composite 
Score 
AL 4.417 1.417 -0.608 1.742 
MS 1.957 0.810 0.641 1.136 
NY -0.228 1.427 1.950 1.050 
UT 0.895 0.781 1.406 1.027 
RI -0.176 0.730 2.489 1.014 
AR 1.343 1.025 0.626 0.998 
OH 1.054 1.110 0.670 0.945 
MT 1.188 1.452 -0.340 0.766 
ND 0.508 1.334 0.400 0.748 
CA -0.246 2.110 0.363 0.742 
PA 1.136 1.076 -0.030 0.728 
NE 0.712 0.858 0.565 0.712 
TX_CIV -0.100 1.169 0.789 0.619 
GA 1.116 0.555 -0.016 0.552 
MD -0.159 1.672 -0.016 0.499 
ME 1.040 0.925 -0.487 0.492 
OK_CIV -0.408 0.538 1.284 0.471 
VA 0.641 1.392 -0.622 0.471 
WV -0.320 1.100 0.625 0.468 
IL -0.385 1.125 0.632 0.457 
SD 0.416 0.969 -0.016 0.456 
NH -0.264 0.654 0.963 0.451 
IA 0.002 1.204 0.113 0.440 
OR -0.999 0.581 1.724 0.435 
WA -0.401 1.518 0.018 0.379 
DE -0.912 2.942 -1.007 0.341 
KS -0.432 1.068 0.183 0.273 
LA -0.141 0.441 0.411 0.237 
WY 0.489 0.825 -0.678 0.212 
FL -0.638 0.837 0.429 0.209 
MA -0.720 1.022 0.297 0.200 
VT -0.407 0.682 0.287 0.187 
ID 1.104 0.751 -1.364 0.164 
TN -0.859 0.863 0.461 0.155 
NJ -0.822 1.362 -0.098 0.147 
AK 0.096 1.007 -0.711 0.131 
MN -0.439 0.919 -0.095 0.128 
SC -0.575 0.942 -0.016 0.117 
CO -0.710 1.178 -0.497 -0.010 
AZ -1.374 0.622 0.592 -0.053 
HI -0.794 0.737 -0.116 -0.058 
CT 0.081 1.193 -1.687 -0.138 
KY -0.700 0.302 -0.216 -0.205 
NM -1.288 0.586 -0.016 -0.239 
WI -0.174 0.888 -1.440 -0.242 
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NV -1.083 0.578 -0.272 -0.259 
IN -0.364 1.064 -2.056 -0.452 
MO -0.779 0.416 -1.245 -0.536 
NC -1.002 0.507 -1.158 -0.551 
MI -0.295 0.740 -3.111 -0.889 
For each measure (total opinions per judge year, outside citations per judge year, and 
independence) we compute the standard deviation from the mean of the sample for each 
state.  For those states without an independence score, we substitute the mean 
independence score for the other states in computing the standard deviation.  We then 
combine the three standard deviation scores with equal weights to generate the equal 
weighted composite score. 
 
Correlation coefficient between common law composite rankings and composite rankings 
(all subject matter areas) in Table 9 = 0.754 (t-statistic = 8.811; significant at the <1% 
level). 
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Appendix B:  Abnormal Score Rankings 
 
Number of Opinions (Abnormal Score) 
State Sel. System Opinions Judge Years Ab. Opinions 
Per Judge Year 
GA NE 1225 21 29.712 
OH NE 989 21 21.263 
AR PE 1038 21 18.589 
PA PE 941 21 16.909 
MT NE 968 21 15.231 
IN M 573 15 13.831 
CT AP 707 23 13.418 
ND NE 703 16 13.145 
WY M 548 15 12.623 
FL M 709 21 11.214 
AL PE 1417 30 10.754 
MA AP 608 23 7.800 
UT M 420 17 6.501 
IL PE 642 22 6.372 
NE M 699 23 5.298 
CA M 605 21 4.451 
MS PE 1437 29 3.082 
AK M 446 18 2.201 
NV NE 259 18 2.174 
WA NE 578 28 2.096 
IA M 715 28 1.076 
ID NE 477 16 -0.054 
AZ M 172 15 -1.335 
OR NE 245 21 -1.384 
TN M 373 16 -2.386 
MN NE 452 24 -2.716 
CO M 386 23 -2.792 
MD M 523 22 -3.084 
KS M 483 21 -3.276 
TX_CRIM PE 583 26 -3.396 
SD M 366 15 -4.101 
ME AP 718 26 -4.741 
NM PE 151 15 -5.087 
RI AP 273 15 -6.133 
HI AP 225 18 -6.422 
DE AP 163 15 -6.525 
WI NE 386 21 -6.733 
VT AP 274 15 -6.746 
NH AP 366 17 -6.881 
NJ AP 376 27 -7.715 
SC AP 387 16 -8.702 
NY AP 380 22 -8.963 
WV PE 346 15 -9.003 
MI NE 389 24 -9.120 
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OK_CIV M 435 28 -10.752 
LA NE 525 24 -10.913 
VA AP 413 21 -11.563 
OK_CRIM M 230 16 -11.912 
KY NE 411 22 -12.525 
TX_CIV PE 347 27 -12.967 
MO M 252 22 -13.324 
NC PE 262 23 -16.490 
Abnormal total opinions per judge-year is calculated by first estimating a model 
using total opinions per judge-year as the dependent variable and state-level controls for 
the age of the state, the log of the population, the log of the aggregate population of 
neighboring states, crime rate, median age of the population, log of gross state product, 
and median income level for 1997.  We estimate the model using pooled state-level data 
over the 1998 to 2000 sample period using ordinary least square as follows: 
 
 Total opinions per judge-yeari  = α + 3ßjiState Controlsji  + εi 
 
We second compute predicted scores total opinions per judge-year using the model and 
then calculate the difference between the actual and predicted scores.  We term this 
residual the “abnormal” score for total opinions per judge-year (e.g., the abnormal total 
opinions per judge year for a state = the actual total opinions per judge year minus the 
predicted total opinions per judge year). 
 
Correlation coefficient between abnormal opinions per judge-year score and opinions per 
judge year score (all subject matter areas) in Table 4 = 0.8548 (t-statistic = 11.64; 
significant at the <1% level). 
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Out-of-State Citations to Majority Opinions (Abnormal Score) 
State Sel. System Citations Judge Years Ab. Citations 
Per Judge Year 
CA M 709 21 18.472 
MT NE 468 21 10.720 
DE AP 336 15 7.309 
WA NE 611 28 7.047 
AR PE 337 21 5.968 
KS M 388 21 5.800 
ND NE 316 16 5.300 
MD M 448 22 4.597 
TN M 242 16 4.475 
SC AP 245 16 4.142 
NE M 371 23 3.483 
AZ M 187 15 3.467 
IN M 244 15 3.224 
MA AP 469 23 2.811 
OH NE 337 21 2.411 
NM PE 143 15 1.790 
CO M 382 23 1.743 
IA M 403 28 1.153 
IL PE 354 22 0.970 
PA PE 336 21 0.631 
WV PE 206 15 0.526 
MS PE 322 29 0.334 
GA NE 262 21 0.269 
SD M 196 15 0.155 
VT AP 206 15 0.042 
WY M 184 15 -0.001 
AL PE 325 30 -0.523 
CT AP 405 23 -0.647 
NJ AP 474 27 -0.708 
AK M 273 18 -1.021 
UT M 134 17 -1.294 
FL M 208 21 -1.428 
ID NE 148 16 -1.436 
NY AP 301 22 -2.526 
MN NE 321 24 -2.573 
NH AP 225 17 -2.925 
LA NE 159 24 -3.178 
VA AP 261 21 -3.310 
NV NE 157 18 -3.345 
WI NE 256 21 -3.381 
TX_CIV PE 243 27 -3.451 
OK_CIV M 160 28 -3.621 
OR NE 137 21 -4.398 
ME AP 284 26 -4.547 
NC PE 170 23 -5.181 
KY NE 145 22 -5.323 
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OK_CRIM M 59 16 -5.648 
RI AP 131 15 -5.895 
MI NE 208 24 -6.027 
MO M 115 22 -7.277 
TX_CRIM PE 105 26 -8.412 
HI AP 150 18 -8.763 
Abnormal outside state citations per judge-year is calculated by first estimating 
a model using outside state citations per judge-year as the dependent variable and state-
level controls for the age of the state, the log of the population, the log of the aggregate 
population of neighboring states, crime rate, median age of the population, log of gross 
state product, and median income level for 1997.  We estimate the model using pooled 
state-level data for our dependent variables over the 1998 to 2000 sample period using 
ordinary least square as follows: 
 
Outside citations per judge-yeari  = α + 3ßjiState Controlsji  + εi 
 
We second compute predicted scores for outside state citations per judge-year using the 
model and then calculate the difference between the actual and predicted scores.  We 
term this residual the “abnormal” score for the outside state citations per judge-year. 
 
Correlation coefficient between abnormal independence score and independence score 
(all subject matter areas) in Table 5 = 0.8905 (t-statistic = 13.84; significant at the <1% 
level). 
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Independence (Abnormal Score) 
State Sel. System Independence Judge Years Ab. Indep. 
OK_CIV M 0.086 28 0.154 
NY AP 0.146 22 0.150 
NH AP 0.057 17 0.138 
RI AP 0.194 15 0.135 
OR NE 0.126 21 0.125 
NE M 0.022 23 0.087 
MS PE 0.028 29 0.075 
IL PE 0.028 22 0.065 
NJ AP -0.038 27 0.061 
OH NE 0.031 21 0.059 
KS M -0.013 21 0.053 
WV PE 0.027 15 0.037 
MD M -0.030 22 0.037 
FL M 0.009 21 0.036 
LA NE 0.008 24 0.033 
IA M -0.019 28 0.032 
AZ M 0.024 15 0.032 
UT M 0.097 17 0.029 
AR PE 0.027 21 0.028 
AK M -0.093 18 0.027 
PA PE -0.032 21 0.026 
WA NE -0.027 28 0.026 
TX_CIV PE 0.042 27 0.025 
TN M 0.012 16 0.017 
ND NE 0.007 16 0.017 
MN NE -0.038 24 0.015 
CA M 0.003 21 0.008 
VA AP -0.085 21 0.006 
HI AP -0.039 18 0.000 
SD M -0.030 15 -0.004 
GA NE -0.030 21 -0.005 
CO M -0.074 23 -0.009 
KY NE -0.048 22 -0.010 
MA AP -0.002 23 -0.011 
NV NE -0.053 18 -0.012 
WY M -0.090 15 -0.018 
SC AP -0.030 16 -0.028 
AL PE -0.084 30 -0.037 
VT AP -0.003 15 -0.039 
TX_CRIM PE -0.032 26 -0.049 
MT NE -0.060 21 -0.050 
DE AP -0.119 15 -0.054 
NM PE -0.030 15 -0.064 
OK_CRIM M -0.140 16 -0.073 
WI NE -0.158 21 -0.088 
CT AP -0.180 23 -0.101 
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ME AP -0.073 26 -0.108 
ID NE -0.151 16 -0.110 
NC PE -0.133 23 -0.114 
MO M -0.141 22 -0.115 
IN M -0.213 15 -0.175 
MI NE -0.308 24 -0.259 
The abnormal independence score is calculated by first estimating a model using 
the independence score as the dependent variable and state-level controls for the age of 
the state, the log of the population, the log of the aggregate population of neighboring 
states, crime rate, median age of the population, log of gross state product, and median 
income level for 1997.  We estimate the model using pooled state-level data for our 
dependent variables over the 1998 to 2000 sample period using ordinary least square as 
follows: 
 
Independencei  = α + 3ßjiState Controlsji  + εi 
 
We second compute predicted scores for independence using the model and then 
calculate the difference between the actual and predicted scores.  For those states without 
an independence score, we substitute the mean independence score for the other states as 
the actual independence score.  We term this residual the “abnormal” score for 
independence. 
 
Correlation coefficient between abnormal independence score and independence score 
(all subject matter areas) in Table 8 = 0.905 (t-statistic = 15.04; significant at the <1% 
level). 
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Abnormal Equal Weight Composite Ranking 
State Standard Dev. 
of Abnormal 
Total Opinion 
Score 
Standard Dev. 
of Abnormal 
Outside Citation 
Score 
Standard Dev. 
of Abnormal 
Indep Score 
Equal Weight 
Composite 
Score 
CA 0.432 3.702 0.102 1.412 
AR 1.806 1.196 0.355 1.119 
OH 2.065 0.483 0.742 1.097 
MT 1.479 2.149 -0.629 1.000 
GA 2.886 0.054 -0.060 0.960 
ND 1.277 1.062 0.211 0.850 
NE 0.515 0.698 1.092 0.768 
PA 1.642 0.127 0.329 0.699 
WA 0.204 1.412 0.322 0.646 
IL 0.619 0.194 0.813 0.542 
KS -0.318 1.163 0.662 0.502 
MS 0.299 0.067 0.937 0.434 
FL 1.089 -0.286 0.448 0.417 
MA 0.758 0.563 -0.135 0.395 
MD -0.300 0.921 0.463 0.361 
WY 1.226 0.000 -0.227 0.333 
AZ -0.130 0.695 0.395 0.320 
TN -0.232 0.897 0.213 0.293 
UT 0.631 -0.259 0.364 0.245 
IA 0.104 0.231 0.397 0.244 
OR -0.134 -0.882 1.562 0.182 
NY -0.871 -0.506 1.872 0.165 
AL 1.045 -0.105 -0.457 0.161 
NH -0.668 -0.586 1.722 0.156 
AK 0.214 -0.205 0.337 0.115 
DE -0.634 1.465 -0.677 0.052 
OK_CIV -1.044 -0.726 1.923 0.051 
CO -0.271 0.349 -0.118 -0.013 
RI -0.596 -1.182 1.693 -0.028 
CT 1.303 -0.130 -1.266 -0.031 
NJ -0.749 -0.142 0.757 -0.045 
IN 1.343 0.646 -2.184 -0.065 
WV -0.874 0.105 0.467 -0.101 
SC -0.845 0.830 -0.349 -0.121 
SD -0.398 0.031 -0.046 -0.138 
MN -0.264 -0.516 0.186 -0.198 
NV 0.211 -0.670 -0.146 -0.202 
NM -0.494 0.359 -0.794 -0.310 
VT -0.655 0.008 -0.482 -0.376 
LA -1.060 -0.637 0.414 -0.428 
TX_CIV -1.260 -0.692 0.307 -0.548 
ID -0.005 -0.288 -1.378 -0.557 
VA -1.123 -0.663 0.071 -0.572 
HI -0.624 -1.756 0.003 -0.792 
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KY -1.217 -1.067 -0.126 -0.803 
WI -0.654 -0.678 -1.100 -0.811 
TX_CRIM -0.330 -1.686 -0.618 -0.878 
ME -0.461 -0.911 -1.350 -0.907 
OK_CRIM -1.157 -1.132 -0.909 -1.066 
NC -1.602 -1.038 -1.431 -1.357 
MO -1.294 -1.459 -1.434 -1.396 
MI -0.886 -1.208 -3.241 -1.778 
For each measure (abnormal total opinions per judge year, abnormal outside citations per 
judge year, and abnormal independence) we compute the standard deviation from the 
mean of the sample for each state.  We then combine the three standard deviation scores 
with equal weights to generate the equal weighted composite score. 
 
Correlation coefficient between abnormal composite rankings and composite rankings 
(all subject matter areas) in Table 9 = 0.936 (t-statistic = 18.84; significant at the <1% 
level). 
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Appendix C: Variable Definitions 
 
Court-Level Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
Adjusted Associate Justice Salary  The associate justice salary reported in 1997 divided by the cost of
living adjustment for 1998 (in thousands of dollars) 
   
Adjusted Partner Salary  The average partner salary in 1998 divided by the cost of living
adjustment for 1998 (in thousands of dollars) 
   
Stable Court  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state high court justices stayed the
same from 1998 to 2000 and 0 otherwise. 
   
Number of Active Judges on Bench  Number of judges who were active at any time from 1998 to 2000 for
the state in question. 
   
No Mandatory Retirement  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judges on the state high court do
not face mandatory retirement and 0 otherwise. 
   
Long-Term Clerk  Indicator variable equal to 1 if state clerks are tenured for more than
one year and 0 if tenure is 1 year or less. 
   
Number of Clerks Per Judge  Average number of clerks per judge in the 1998 to 2000 time period.
   
Law Clerk Opportunity Cost  The difference between the average salary of an entering associate at
law firm in that state and the law clerk salary (in thousands of
dollars).  
   
Number of Trial Cases in the State  Number of trial cases in the entire state in 1998 (in thousands). 
   
Intermediate Appellate Court  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the opinion is in opposition to the
opinion of another judge in the same case and 0 otherwise.  In the
case of a dissenting opinion written by the judge in question, the
opinion is treated as in active opposition to the majority opinion.  In
the case of a majority opinion by the judge in question, active
opposition exists if the majority opinion is opposed by a dissenting
opinion. 
   
Mandatory Publication  Indicator variable equal to 1 if judges on the state high court face a
mandatory publication rule and 0 otherwise.  
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State-Level Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
State Age  Age of the state in 1997.  For year-level data this is defined as the 
difference between the year in question and the year of admission of 
the state into the United States.   
   
State Population  The population of the state in millions measured in 1997.   
   
Border Population  Total population of all bordering states of the state in question 
(measured as of 1997 in millions). 
   
Crime Index  Overall crime rate for the state (including property and violent crime)
per 100,000 people from the FBI Crime Report for 1997.   
   
Gross State Product  Gross State Product (measured as of 1998 in billion of dollars). 
   
Median Age of Population  Median age of state population (2000 U.S. Census) 
   
State Median Income  Median per capita income of the state population (2000 U.S. Census
in thousands of dollars) 
   
Black Population Fraction  Fraction of the population comprised of blacks as obtained from the
2000 Census. 
   
Citizen Ideology Score  Measure of citizen ideology based on election results in each district,
which are then used to compute a statewide average (ultimately based
on interest group ratings of a given state's federal congressional
delegation) (from Berry et al. 1998).  
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